

# **AFGHANISTAN: PEACE AND REPATRIATION?**

## **A STAFF REPORT**

### **PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS**

OF THE

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## MEMORANDUM OF TRANSMITTAL

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To: Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman; and Senator Alan K. Simpson, Ranking Minority Member.

From: Members of Subcommittee Study Mission: Jerry M. Tinker, Staff Director; Michael Myers, Counsel; Richard W. Day, Minority Counsel; and Gregory Craig, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Kennedy.

The attached report reflects our findings and recommendations based upon a week-long study mission to the field in early April 1988 to assess the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan. During our stay in Pakistan we conferred with senior officials of the Pakistan Government, with international and voluntary agencies, and with the U.S. Ambassador and his senior staff. We visited refugee villages along the Afghan-Pakistan border in the Peshawar region and in Quetta, and had extensive conversations with those officials working directly with refugees both in Pakistan as well as in the cross-border operation into Afghanistan. We also met with representatives of the Afghan resistance.

In addition to official briefings here in Washington, we returned through Geneva to consult with U.S. negotiators and the Pakistan Foreign Minister on the terms of the Geneva accord and the modalities for its implementation.

In light of developments in the field, and particularly in Geneva with the signing of the accord, the Afghan refugee situation has clearly reached a major crossroad, presenting new problems and some extraordinary new challenges to the international community—in particular to the four signatory parties to the accords and their associates in the field.

This report is a "snap shot" assessment of current issues and developments in what is admittedly a rapidly changing situation. We have attempted to report the perspective from the field, as well as outline some options, contingency plans, and new programs that will likely be required to deal with the changing Afghan refugee situation—particularly in anticipation of a major repatriation effort funded by the international community over the coming year.

The following reflects our views and findings. However, we were assisted by Timothy Lenderking in the preparation of background research and analysis. Mr. Lenderking served as a subcommittee intern following work with voluntary agency programs in Pakistan in 1987, and we greatly appreciate his important contributions to this report.

## FOREWORD

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By SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

For 9 long years, the world's largest refugee population has lived with the hope that one day they might be able to return to their war-ravaged country. Beginning in 1979 when the Soviet Union sent armies of invasion and occupation into neighboring Afghanistan, 5 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran to escape the invading Soviet troops and the brutal repression that followed.

Today, there is the prospect that these long years of suffering and conflict may finally be drawing to a close. But many obstacles and challenges remain to be met and overcome before peace will return to Afghanistan.

This report outlines the origins of the conflict and describes the Soviet invasion, the developing refugee crisis and, thanks to a political and diplomatic breakthrough, the prospects for the repatriation of the refugees and a political settlement in Afghanistan. It also relates the extraordinary suffering the Afghan people have experienced as well as the generous outpouring of international relief and assistance to help millions of men, women and children in need.

The international program of humanitarian assistance has allowed millions of Afghans to escape and to live in relative safety, but the key to the end of this crisis has been the courage and determination of the Afghan freedom fighters who have fought so valiantly to resist Soviet occupation. Against all odds and with limited outside support, they carried on the struggle. And now, because of that resistance, the Soviets have been persuaded that their troops must finally leave Afghanistan to the Afghan people.

That decision came in the context of long and patient negotiations led by United Nations mediator, Diego Cordovez. His persistent intervention, at the direction of the U.N. Secretary General and in response to repeated resolutions from the General Assembly, set the stage for the signing of the Geneva accords on April 14, 1988. This historic document establishes a framework that will allow the people of Afghanistan the chance to work for peace and stability and self-determination. This agreement will not end the fighting, but it will surely hasten the day when millions of Afghan refugees will be able to return to their homes and lands.

In addition to the heroism of the Afghans themselves and the patient persistence of U.N. mediator Cordovez, another factor that contributed to the Soviets' decision was the sustained, bipartisan support for the policy initiated by President Carter and continued by President Reagan to provide assistance to the Afghan people and their efforts to resist Soviet occupation.

The tasks that remain are great, and good will alone will not be enough. Serious political and humanitarian issues must still be resolved, requiring continued determination and generosity. Without that, there is little chance that the refugees will be able to return, or that a genuine peace will replace years of conflict in the countryside.

At this crucial stage, we and others involved in the peace process must be vigilant against those who would undermine the Geneva accords or otherwise continue the conflict. In particular, the United States must—

- continue to provide support to the international agencies involved in the refugee effort;

- support scrupulous implementation and verification of the Geneva accords;

- use whatever leverage the United States has at its disposal to support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan; and

- within the context of the accords, maintain existing levels of assistance for the Afghan people who seek to return to their country and rebuild their nation.

If these four challenges can be met, even minimally, then peace and some stability may again return to Afghanistan and the long suffering of its people will come to an end.


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## I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. POLICY ISSUES

(a) *The aims of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should be the following:*

—The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from all of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf;

—A political resolution of the differences between the various Afghani factions—including the PDPA—that will end the fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate national government in Kabul; and

—The return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to Afghanistan.

(b) *To achieve these objectives, the United States should:*

—Support implementation and verification of the accords;

—Support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan;

—Continue to support those international agencies, such as the UNHCR and the ICRC, that will be involved with the repatriation of the Afghan refugees; and

—In this connection, the United States should resist all temptations to recognize a provisional government in the weeks ahead, for it would be a sure-fire formula for a protracted civil war. We must allow the U.N. peace process to work, and to take no action that could be perceived as undermining the Geneva accords.

(c) *U.S. policy should retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate any of the possible outcomes in Afghanistan.*—The U.S. should support continued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at existing levels, while understanding that whatever influence and leverage the United States can exercise with the Afghans is, at best, extremely limited. For that reason, the United States should take care that it not become identified with one Afghan faction over the others.

(d) *The way in which the United States distributes its assistance to the Afghans in the future—which Afghans receive it and from whom—is a problem that deserves serious attention.*—It may well be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our cross-border AID operation so that other nations—e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China—are also involved in this effort.

### 2. REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

(a) *The Afghan refugee program in Pakistan is a model for programs in other parts of the world.*—The government of Pakistan has ably shouldered the burden of hosting 3 million refugees, and



has been generously assisted by governments, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and voluntary agencies.

(b) *The repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is unlikely to be sudden, and probably will not begin in large numbers until this autumn or the spring of 1989.*—Most refugees and relief workers interviewed suggest that refugees will await the departure of Soviet forces—and possibly even the collapse of the current Kabul regime—before returning to Afghanistan.

(c) *The relief organizations currently working in Pakistan, or in the cross-border operation, are competently staffed and well attuned to the needs of the refugees.*—These organizations' programs can easily be transformed from relief to repatriation. However, the obstacles to the establishment of a repatriation resettlement and rehabilitation infrastructure within Afghanistan are extraordinarily serious.

(d) *Afghan refugees will likely return based upon a realistic assessment of their prospects of survival, and many families will be able to reintegrate successfully on their own without massive assistance.*—Many refugee families have frequently returned to Afghanistan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home villages. As a result, many know the extent of damage to their property, and the effort that will be required to recultivate their fields and regain their livelihoods.

(e) *The international community should rely heavily upon the expertise already developed in Pakistan to both plan and execute the repatriation program.*—Refugee officers of the Pakistan government and U.N. agencies, as well as voluntary agencies involved with the current humanitarian cross-border operation, already have an impressive knowledge of such vital factors as:

- migration routes into Afghanistan;
- the places of origin within the country from which the refugees have migrated;
- where distribution centers could most productively be located within the country; and
- the extent of medical services available internally and the means to maintain them, and much more.

(f) *The international community must be prepared to function within Afghanistan to the maximum degree possible, even in the absence of clear governmental authority within the country.*—Under such circumstances, it will be necessary for the international community to provide strong support to agencies which are expert in relief operations under sensitive political circumstances—primarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

(g) *The United States should support the decision by the United Nations Secretary General to appoint as U.N. coordinator such a distinguished person as Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. He has stature in both international diplomacy and relief operations to coordinate international assistance both in and outside of Afghanistan.*—Because the repatriation program has been made possible through the United Nations negotiations and sanctioned by the Geneva accords, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary General to maintain, through his representative, a leading role.

Given the complexity and size of the repatriation program, and the humanitarian needs within Afghanistan—as well as the number of U.N., international, voluntary agencies, and bilateral programs that are likely to be involved—international coordination will certainly be required. In this context, however, there should be no question that the lead agency for the repatriation program should be the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, who has the experience and ability as well as the presence in the field.

## **II. POLICY ISSUES: WILL THERE BE PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN?**

The study mission's trip occurred in the midst of rumors that the Geneva accords were in the final stages of negotiation. In fact, what initially prompted the decision to make the trip was General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement on February 8, 1988 that the Soviet Union planned to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year. If the Soviets were to follow through on Gorbachev's announcement, the situation inside Afghanistan could change so dramatically and so rapidly that the Afghan refugee population might embark on a sudden mass migratory return to Afghanistan, thereby creating a serious challenge for the various international and private voluntary organizations involved in the refugee effort. Such a decision taken spontaneously and simultaneously by 5 million Afghan refugees—2 million in Iran and 3 million in Pakistan—to return to their war-torn home country would pose a repatriation problem of historic proportions.



It turned out that there was more than mere rumor behind the report that the talks were nearing completion. While the delegation was in Pakistan, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Tashkent to meet with General Najibullah, the leader of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. And the day that the delegation arrived in Geneva to meet with representatives of the UNHCR and the ICRC (Thursday, April 7, 1988), U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced that an agreement had been reached and would be soon be signed. In fact, the accords were signed in Geneva one week later (Thursday, April 14, 1988).

The primary purpose of the trip was to look at the refugee programs inside Pakistan and to examine plans for repatriation of the Afghan refugee population. But given the political atmosphere at the time, every conversation included extensive discussion about the impending accords, their impact on the situation in Afghanistan, and what the likely political and military scenarios for Afghanistan might be—if and when, and after the Soviet army withdrew from its 9-year occupation of that country.

This section of the Report will present some of the views that the study mission encountered on non-refugee matters.

#### A. THE GENEVA ACCORDS

The details of the accords were unknown at the time of our conversations in Pakistan, and the way in which "symmetry" between the Americans and the Soviets would be achieved was similarly unknown. Nonetheless, there was a general understanding that the accords involved a commitment by the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within 9 months after implementation of the accords, and that Pakistan would, in return, pledge to refrain from any activities that "interfered" in internal Afghan affairs, i.e., Pakistan would agree to terminate the use of Pakistani territory as a sanctuary for the Mujahidin.

##### (1) THE MUJAHIDIN

The spokesman for the alliance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, expressed intense opposition to the accords. Hekmatyar's views were as follows:

First, Geneva is meaningless without the participation or approval of the Mujahidin. With or without the accords, the war will go on. The people are prepared to continue their sacrifice. There is no sign of fatigue. Time is on the side of the Mujahidin. They are better organized and better armed than ever before, and their morale is at an all-time high. The only way that a real peace can be achieved is for the real parties to the conflict—the Soviet Union and the Mujahidin—to engage in negotiations. The Mujahidin have offered to talk with the Soviets about (a) the pace and mode of their withdrawal, and (b) allowing their departure to occur without violence. But the Soviets decline to engage in any such negotiations.

Second, the Geneva process and the accords themselves benefit the Soviets. The Soviets came uninvited and without conditions. Why should they be able to extract concessions from the United

States and Pakistan as a "price" for their departure? The Soviets have suffered an unprecedented military defeat, and Geneva simply pulls the rug out from under those who have won the victory. Geneva was designed to serve Soviet interests, and only when the accords were ready to be signed did the Americans and the Pakistanis realize exactly how the agreement helped the Soviets. The accords legitimize the Najibullah government and strengthen the Soviets' argument that outsiders are interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Evidence of the Soviets' real intentions can be found in their resistance to the Pakistani proposal for an interim government and in their unhappiness at the American objections to continued Soviet military aid to Najibullah. The Soviets are trying to achieve at the negotiating table what they could not achieve with "murderous force" on the battlefield—that is, the survival of the Najibullah regime. That is the Soviet purpose in Geneva—to guarantee Najibullah's future in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Third, the accords are "flawed" because they are premised on the notion that the war is about the Soviet military presence. That is only partly true. The war is also about the presence of a Communist government in Kabul. The war will not end until Najibullah is out and a non-Communist government is in Kabul.

Fourth, the Pakistani government has no business in these negotiations. The Pakistanis have no authority to negotiate for the Afghan people. In fact, the Pakistanis have a right only to be concerned about the refugees. By participating in the talks, the Pakistanis have allowed the Soviets to create a rift between the Mujahidin and Pakistan, an important Soviet objective.

Fifth, the accords place Pakistan in an untenable position. In exchange for the Soviet pledge to withdraw, Pakistan will pledge that its territory will not be used in the future by the Mujahidin. Pakistan must either comply, in which case the Mujahidin will have to leave Pakistan, or Pakistan will have to violate the accords. If Pakistan signs this agreement with an intention to violate it, Pakistan shouldn't sign at all.

## (2) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

In meetings with U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel in Islamabad, Consul General Michael Malinowski in Peshawar and Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Peck in Geneva, these administration spokesmen stated their support for the accords, so long as the accords recognized the principle of "symmetry" with respect to Soviet military assistance to Najibullah and U.S. support for the Mujahidin.

First, this agreement is historic in that it marks the first time since the Soviet withdrew from Austria in 1955 that the Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its military forces from territory that it has occupied. In light of Gorbachev's new policies, historians might look back at this agreement and conclude that it represented a turning point in Soviet foreign policy—a decision to retrench and consolidate, to rebuild and modernize the Soviet economy rather than to continue to pursue adventurist, expansionist ambitions.

Second, in the absence of an agreement involving a formal commitment by the Soviets to leave Afghanistan which includes specific deadlines for their departure, the Soviets have no formal obligation to withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan or to return to the pre-invasion borders. There is at least some danger that the Soviets may try to create a redoubt in the North, a buffer zone inside Afghanistan which would result in a de facto partition of Afghanistan. The existence of the agreement adds to the pressure on the Soviets to get all the way out of Afghanistan. It is true that the Mujahidin forces are militarily much stronger than they used to be, but they have not yet taken any Soviet garrisons, and it is inaccurate to say that the Soviets have been defeated militarily. The Soviets have decided only that they are unwilling to continue to pay the price of remaining in Afghanistan. A great power like the Soviet Union has the ability to carry on with a flawed policy—as the United States did in Southeast Asia—if it is willing to pay the price. This agreement simply codifies the Soviet's decision to leave entirely, rather than deploying to new positions within Afghanistan that are more tenable politically and militarily.

Third, if the Mujahidin are so confident of their ability to overwhelm the Najibullah regime after the Soviets depart, then the key to getting rid of Najibullah is, in fact, getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Most Western analysts agree with the Mujahidin that no amount of Soviet aid will enable the Najibullah government to survive for more than a brief time. After all, the rate of desertions in the Afghan army has been so high, it is notorious throughout the world as the only army where more troops have fled than fought. The Mujahidin's second objective—a non-Communist government in Kabul—is not sacrificed in order to achieve the first objective—the Soviets' departure. On the contrary, they are inextricably linked, one leads to the other. The Soviets' withdrawal will make it possible for a government to emerge in Kabul that reflects the will of the Afghan people.

Fourth, so long as the accords recognize the principle of symmetry, the Mujahidin will not be disadvantaged—i.e., they will continue to receive U.S. military assistance if Najibullah continues to receive Soviet assistance.

Fifth, although no one believes that the mere departure of the Soviet troops will end the fighting, it will substantially diminish the scale and intensity of the violence. With the Soviets gone and with military assistance terminated, the conflict may well continue but at reduced levels of destruction.

Sixth, the primary U.S. objective in Afghanistan has been to secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces, to reduce the threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, and to impose a cost on Moscow for engaging in such adventurist policies. It is of less interest to the United States who or what faction is in power in Kabul so long as the government of Afghanistan is, in fact, a genuine national government and not just a Soviet puppet.

Finally, the success of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is, in large measures, attributable to the sustained, bipartisan support for that policy in Congress. Our ultimate success in ending the Soviet occupation and restoring Afghanistan to the Afghan people will also

depend upon maintaining and continuing that kind of broad and strong support for U.S. policy in the future.

### (3) THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

During an interview in Geneva, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zain Noorani, added the following observations:

First, rather than legitimating Najibullah, the accords place the Mujahidin on an equal footing with the Communist government in Kabul. The accords recognize Najibullah's party—the PDPA—as just another faction inside Afghanistan, not as a government. The Mujahidin can no longer be treated as “terrorists and bandits” as the Soviets have called them.

Second, the accords place restraints on future Soviet action in two ways: if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan, they will have violated their commitment as set forth in the accords and, more importantly, the war will go on as before. If the Soviets continue to arm Najibullah, the Americans have the right to continue to arm the Mujahidin, thereby providing an incentive to the Soviets to stop arming Najibullah. In short, the accords set up a regime that promotes Soviet restraint in the future.

### B. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Under the accords, the Soviet withdrawal must commence on May 15, 1988. The withdrawal must be completed within 9 months—by February 15, 1989—and half of the Soviet troops must be out within the first 3 months—by August 15, 1988.

Assuming that the Soviet troops are withdrawn in accordance with that schedule, various views were expressed on the following issues:

*Issue No. 1.*—Whether the Mujahidin commanders will pursue the Soviet troops as they withdraw, attacking the weakened Soviet positions as they leave, inflicting greater loss of life as an exercise in retribution and vengeance for the brutality of the Soviet occupation. There is an historic precedent for this kind of tactic in the 19th century when the Afghans savagely attacked and decimated a departing British army.

There were two responses to this question: Yes, the withdrawing Soviets would be attacked, said the spokesman for the Alliance (Hegmatyar). The Soviets had been given the opportunity to negotiate their safe departure but had rejected it. And No, the people were tired of the bloodshed and would let the Soviet troops leave in peace, said one of the commanders we met in a refugee camp.

In fact, there is reason to believe that there will be no coordinated policy by the Mujahidin. It is most likely that individual commanders will treat the departing Soviet troops not according to some national policy but as each individual commander sees fit.

*Issue No. 2.*—Whether the Mujahidin will continue the war if the Soviets do not withdraw beyond the pre-invasion borders.

There was unanimity on this issue in principle. All Afghans said that the Soviets must withdraw all the way, or the war will continue. Western observers—mostly journalists—expressed reservations. They raised some doubt about whether the Mujahidin who live in the South will in fact be sufficiently committed to regaining terri-



tory in the North actually to carry the war beyond their own villages and valleys. These observers say that, after Kabul falls, the Mujahidin will not behave as a national army but will revert to bands of warriors loyal to regional and local leaders. See Scenario No. 3 below.

### C. POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN

Other issues of interest and concern to the delegation included various possible scenarios that might develop after the Soviets withdraw. Four scenarios seem possible:

*Scenario No. 1—The stalemate/partition.*—If the Soviets leave and Najibullah holds on, if Najibullah's party maintains control over Kabul and the northern provinces—or if there is only a partial Soviet withdrawal—the result might be a de facto partition of Afghanistan with Najibullah's forces, supported by the Soviets, unable to occupy all of Afghanistan and unable to dislodge or defeat the Mujahidin, and the Mujahidin, supported and supplied by the West and governing through a provisional government, but unable to defeat or remove Najibullah. This is the most pessimistic scenario. With two competing governments locked in combat for control of the country, it is the formula for a protracted and bloody civil war.

*Scenario No. 2—An interim government.*—If the various competing factions—including Najibullah's PDPA—are able to agree to an interim government, there could be an early peaceful resolution of the conflict. The interim government would operate from Kabul until nation-wide elections are held. This scenario, by far the most optimistic, might produce a peaceful and stable transition.

*Scenario No. 3—Civil war without Najibullah.*—If the Soviets withdraw, if Najibullah cannot hold on, and if efforts to forge an interim government are unsuccessful, there could be continued turmoil between and among the factions within the Mujahidin—an Afghan civil war without Najibullah.

*Scenario No. 4—Najibullah makes peace.*—Many close observers of the Afghan political leadership believe that Najibullah is by far the shrewdest and most sophisticated political leader involved in Afghanistan today. He is said to be "a real survivor." It is conceivable that Najibullah will try to split the Mujahidin by reaching out and negotiating a separate peace with various elements within the Mujahidin in an effort to isolate the fundamentalists. A Najibullah-led coalition government could succeed if the Mujahidin revert to their old-time rivalries.

The likelihood of each of these scenarios depends upon the following factors:

—How long and whether the Najibullah regime will be able to hold out after the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan. At least one expert believes that the Mujahidin and U.S. intelligence seriously under-estimate the ability of Najibullah's party, the PDPA, to hold on. He sees Najibullah as being tough and competent, and the Afghan army as being able, with continued Soviet support, to maintain control over some areas of Afghanistan. In his view, the notion that, after the Soviets depart, the Mujahidin will be able to walk into Kabul and take

over the government is "wildly unrealistic." Others suggest that Najibullah's government "will fall like a house-of-cards."

—Whether U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez will be successful in his efforts to negotiate the establishment of an interim government that can effectively rule Afghanistan until nationwide elections can be held. Will the Mujahidin be willing to participate in a government that includes members of Najibullah's party? Will Najibullah insist that he be a member of the interim government?

—Whether the Mujahidin will continue to work together after the Soviets depart or whether, once the common enemy has disappeared, the coalition will fall apart and the various factions within the Mujahidin will begin fighting with one another. And, even more likely, if Najibullah also departs, whether the Mujahidin will squabble among themselves about which faction should be dominant in Kabul?

—Whether the Mujahidin commanders have any political loyalties, whether they really care about who is in Kabul, or whether their primary concern is to be left alone by whatever government is established in Kabul?

—Whether the leaders of the alliance have the support of the Afghan people or whether the alliance will cease to exist as a relevant political force inside Afghanistan once the Soviets leave and the alliance leaders return;

—Whether the people of Afghanistan are in fact prepared to accept a fundamentalist government. What is the level of support for the fundamentalist parties among the Afghan people? What is the likelihood of a fundamentalist government taking power in Kabul, and what impact would that have in the region—particularly with respect to the Muslim population in the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union?

—Whether the Afghan fundamentalists are like Khomeini or whether, because they are Sunni as opposed to Shia, the Afghan brand of fundamentalism is different from the Iranian.

#### D. U.S. Policy

The study mission believes one reason for the success of U.S. policy in the region has been the sustained, or bipartisan support for that policy in Congress throughout two administrations, one Democratic, one Republican. The study mission believes that continued bipartisan support for U.S. policy is crucial, and to achieve that support, recommends that the primary aims of U.S. policy in the region should be the following:

—(1) The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from all of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf;

—(2) A political resolution of the differences between the various Afghanistan factions—including the PDPA—that will end the fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate national government in Kabul; and

—(3) A return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to Afghanistan.

The study mission believes that, to achieve these objectives, the United States should (a) support implementation and verification of the accords; (b) support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan; (c) resist the temptation to recognize a provisional government—a sure-fire formula for a protracted civil war; and (d) continue to support those international agencies, such as the UNHCR and the ICRC, that will be involved with the repatriation of the Afghan refugees.

The study mission believes that there are so many uncertainties and variables in the Afghan situation that U.S. policy should retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate any of the four scenarios outlined above. For that reason, the study mission supports continued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at existing levels.

The study mission has one word of caution with respect to the cross-border AID program now in progress. The United States should take care not to make the same mistake that has haunted the Soviet Union for 9 years. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an outside power to determine winners and losers inside Afghanistan. Only the Afghan people are able to do that.

The Soviet Union, even from the vantage point of a bordering nation and even with the use of 115,000 troops, could not impose its political will upon the people of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the United States should recognize its limited ability to affect the situation inside Afghanistan and should understand that whatever influence and leverage the United States can exercise with the Afghans is, at best, attenuated. For that reason, the United States should take care that it not become identified with one Afghan faction over any of the others. The United States has no capacity to determine who will govern in Kabul, and we should take pains to avoid being embroiled in the inevitable competition that will arise among the Afghans as the Soviets depart.

For that reason, the way in which the United States distributes its assistance to the Afghans in the future—which Afghans receive the aid, how and from whom—is a problem that deserves serious attention. It may well be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our cross-border AID operation so that other nations—e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China—are also involved in this effort.

### III. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES: REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AND REPATRIATION

The refugee program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is both a unique as well as a model example of how the United Nations Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees would hope countries of first asylum would treat arriving refugees—and Pakistan is not even a signatory to the Convention or Protocol. For that the government of Pakistan deserves great credit in hosting a growing tide of refugees from Afghanistan for the past 10 years.

It is "unique" in the sense that most of the Afghan refugees arriving in the northwest frontier provinces of Pakistan are ethnically and tribally related. There has also been an historic movement of these people across what, to them, has been an internationally imposed (indeed, colonial British) boundary. Thus welcoming the arrival of ethnically related villagers was considered the only hospitable thing to do. As Mr. Ahmed Zeb Khan, an officer with the Northwest Frontier Province Commission for Afghan refugees said during an interview, this ethnic similarity means the refugees "know how to behave as guests, and we know our duties as host." But, as related later in this report, this initial and generous welcome—while it has lasted for many years—has begun to fray.

It has been "a model" in the sense that the relief and assistance programs established by the government of Pakistan, with the support and coordination of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, has been extraordinarily successful by any international standard. The coordination between governments, the United Nations, and the voluntary agencies has been, by all accounts, extremely effective. Obviously, there have been many problems—as related in this report—but by-and-large, most observers of international refugee programs rate the Afghan program in Pakistan as one of the more generous (on the part of the country of first asylum) and more successful in terms of international support (through the UNHCR).

For the past many years, the focus of the international program of humanitarian assistance has necessarily been on the care and maintenance of a growing refugee population—from a few thousand before 1980 to an estimated 3 million this year. During this period, refugee "camps" (with temporary tents and relief facilities) have been transformed into refugee "villages" that can be hardly distinguished from local Pakistani villages in many areas.

The focus today, however, is how these refugees and their temporary villages will be able to return to their native land. The Geneva accords, and the prospects they hold for a repatriation of Afghan refugees, could represent one of the largest repatriation movements in recent history. In 1972, following the India-Bangladesh crisis, approximately 7 to 9 million Bengalis returned from India to their villages in Bangladesh—numerically one of the largest repatriations in modern history. But, as a percentage of popula-

tion, it represented only 12 percent of East Bengal's population. Today, in Afghanistan, the return of 3 million refugees from Pakistan, 2 million from Iran, and the assistance of an estimated 1 million (and possibly more than 2 million) internally displaced Afghans, will involve nearly 45 percent of Afghanistan's total estimated population. In per capita terms, the Afghan repatriation could be one of the world's largest.

However, the repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is not likely to be sudden. For the very reason refugees flee their homelands—conflict, violence and political strife—they are not likely to return until those conditions are resolved. In Afghanistan that may be some period of time.

Most observers believe some spontaneous movement of a small number of refugees could begin in southern Afghanistan after the Soviet troops begin their withdrawal. However, most believe no large-scale, organized movement can begin until early next year—perhaps beginning in the autumn, but mostly in the early months of 1989. The planting season, among many other factors, will clearly help determine their movement.

As in all refugee repatriations, refugees will likely return based upon their own—or their community's—realistic assessment of their prospects of survival, and many families will be able to reintegrate successfully on their own without massive assistance. Hopefully, this prospect will offset expected gaps in assistance within Afghanistan.

Adult males within the refugee families have already frequently returned to Afghanistan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home villages. As a result, most refugees know the extent of damage to their property, and the effort that will be required to recultivate their fields and regain their livelihoods.

#### A. REPATRIATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The structure already exists in Pakistan to facilitate an orderly repatriation of Afghan refugees. The current relief program of the UNHCR and Pakistani government—as well as the U.S. AID cross-border operation—have all the essential components needed to support a large-scale repatriation effort. The transition will be complex and problematic, but possible. Given the time now available for proper planning as well as budgeting, the international community can prepare for such a large-scale program.

But while there is every possibility of the orderly movement of refugees from Pakistan, the international community must be prepared to face far greater difficulties in assisting their rehabilitation and resettlement in the war-torn countryside of Afghanistan. Basic rehabilitation assistance within Afghanistan—such as the provision of transitional food supplies, seeds and farm implements, medicines, public health and logistical support—is essential to create the conditions that will make it both possible and desirable for the refugees to return. Yet, providing these basic needs in Afghanistan will clearly be the greatest challenge facing the repatriation effort.

Therefore the United Nations and the international community must be prepared to function within Afghanistan to the maximum degree possible, even in the absence of clear governmental author-

ity. Refugees may be returning to Afghanistan before the political and military situation is fully settled. It is even possible that the current government in Kabul may not support the international community's efforts to assist the return of the refugees in areas they do not control, especially since most oppose the Najibullah government. Even more likely is the prospect that some of the Afghan resistance parties will try to stop refugees from returning or hinder the efforts of organizations working on repatriation until a political solution satisfactory to their faction is achieved.

Under such circumstances, it will be necessary for the international community to provide strong support to agencies which are expert in relief operations under sensitive political circumstances—primarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In addition, the work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees must be guided by pragmatism, rather than by Afghan politics, in determining its operation within Afghanistan—such as was necessary for U.N. organizations which faced the Kampuchean famine.

#### 1. THE COSTS OF REPATRIATION

In meetings in Pakistan, there were a wide variety of views as to the projected costs of the Afghan repatriation program. Refugee program officials outside Pakistan (in the United States and Europe) tended toward higher estimates, with costs as high as \$1.5 billion. But those working with the refugees in Pakistan—as well as personnel engaged in cross-border humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan—tended toward much lower estimates. In fact, certain Pakistan government officials believed the price of repatriation to be as low as \$46 million, assuming also that the international community would for a period continue its food assistance to the Afghan refugees at current levels.

In the meantime, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Program has developed a provisional plan for repatriation from Pakistan which contains more reliable estimates. This plan currently is being circulated among likely donor governments for comment, and may later be developed into an official U.N. appeal to governments for assistance.

The provisional U.N. plan recognizes the difficulty of projecting the number of refugees who will participate in an international repatriation effort, as opposed to simply returning spontaneously. It provides a scale of possible costs as follows:

For 1 million refugees.....	\$130 million
For 2 million refugees.....	226 million
For 3 million refugees.....	324 million

These costs include the purchase of basic equipment required for repatriation; transport and other logistics over 1 year; and 6 months of food assistance to each returnee.

It is the sense of Pakistan government officials, voluntary agency staff, and others in the field that as many as one-third of the refugees will return independently, with some estimating that as many as two-thirds will return on their own. While it is proper, for planning purposes, to anticipate the return of all 3 million refugees in Pakistan, it is probably more likely that only about 2 million will actually participate in the U.N. program.

However, the uncertainties of this repatriation—the fact that there are no facts about when and how this refugee population will return—require the continuation of international commitment to the relief program in Pakistan for the foreseeable future. While the likelihood is that the refugees will begin returning in large numbers next spring, or as early as this fall, the volatile political situation in Afghanistan may preclude their return until much later. In either case, the assistance programs in Pakistan must continue.

Planning is also proceeding for longer-term development within Afghanistan. One estimate of the cost of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Afghanistan over a 4-year period, prepared for the U.N. Development Program, was \$1.3 billion. If the cost of the repatriation movement is added, UNDP estimated the figure to be over \$1.5 billion.

## 2. THE GENEVA ACCORDS, REPATRIATION, AND THE U.N. ROLE

The accords signed in Geneva on April 14 were in four parts, one of which addressed specifically the question of refugee repatriation.

The refugee instrument is intended to guarantee that well-established international principles governing repatriation shall apply in this case. This includes, for example, the right to voluntary repatriation, the right to freely exercise one's religion upon return, and other protections. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is called upon to exercise his conventional role of ensuring that the repatriation proceeds properly, with full international protections for the returnees.

Obviously, any repatriation program is complex, but the Afghan return is complicated by almost a decade of warfare and destruction in Afghanistan, the fragility of Afghan politics over the coming period, and the desperate needs which will exist within the country not only to resettlement returnees, but to restore some of the country's war-damaged infrastructure.

These challenges call for the full array of international programs, and the U.N. Secretary General has taken the proper step in appointing Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as an overall coordinator who can make clear soon which agencies and which individuals are to fulfill what roles.

Certain roles are already clear. Mr. Diego Cordovez, the U.N. official who negotiated the Geneva accords, will now devote his capacities to monitoring its implementation. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees has a specific mandate under international law to facilitate repatriation. As such, UNHCR should be the lead agency for repatriation. The World Food Program has assured food delivery for the refugees for several years now, and should continue to help in the repatriation as well, in cooperation with UNHCR. And beyond repatriation will be the longer-term development needs of Afghanistan.

To date, the politics of Afghanistan and the mechanisms of refugee assistance have been to proceed independently. However, with repatriation, they become critically important pieces of a single mosaic, and the international community must support Prince Sadruddin as he assumes the overall coordination which will be re-

quired within the United Nations and on behalf of the international community.

### 3. FACTORS INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION

Any repatriation program must take into account several of the unique characteristics of the Afghan refugee scene. Many of these traits will facilitate the return of the refugees; others pose major impediments.

A distinct advantage, for repatriation purposes, is that the vast majority of the refugees come from areas in Afghanistan which are proximate to Pakistan. One survey by Pakistani officials revealed that as many as 80 percent of the refugees are from within 250 kilometers of the border. This narrows the logistical burden of repatriation considerably. In fact, it is likely that many refugees will be able simply to walk home.

The same Pakistan government survey found that 90 percent of the refugees have rural, agrarian origins. This should limit the requirements of repatriation. The vast majority of the refugees will return to retill the lands their families have farmed for generations. They will not be in the cities, requiring jobs, apartments, and other support. Most can survive with initial food and the agricultural supplies to recultivate their farms.

The protracted exile of the refugees has enabled the development of an impressive cast of individuals and organizations engaged both in the assistance of refugees and in humanitarian assistance programs across the border in Afghanistan. This network of voluntary agencies, Pakistani officials, U.S. personnel, and others will certainly prove invaluable in the repatriation effort.

In particular, the various cross border humanitarian programs are an indispensable source of information on conditions in areas to which the refugees will return. Some voluntary agencies, such as those working in AID's humanitarian cross-border operation and the Swedish Development Committee, have already conducted surveys of agricultural conditions in Afghanistan, the availability of medical services, and more. These agencies and their information should be used heavily in the repatriation.

In addition, Pakistan possesses a logistical infrastructure capable of sustaining a major repatriation operation. The massive food requirements of the 3 million refugees have been met using only one of Pakistan's seaports, Qasim, without resort to others which could be used if expanded docking facilities are required. And a fairly impressive array of commercial trucks has transported supplies to refugee settlements throughout the country. U.S. experts calculate that there is a great capacity for this system to expand quickly if necessary.

Finally, the refugees themselves, while generally cautious, are nonetheless anxious to return home. The study mission found little basis to the claim that large numbers of Afghans will choose residence in Pakistan over a return to Afghanistan. In fact, most refugee relief officials found it preposterous, knowing the refugees, that there is any reason to believe that anything more than a very small minority of Afghans will remain in Pakistan. Their over-



whelming desire to go home should be a boost to efforts to reintegrate them into their homeland.

But there are numerous challenges to repatriation as well. A steady refrain was the danger to repatriation of a vast array of land mines and other unexploded ordnance present throughout Afghanistan, reportedly in large amounts. The number of civilian casualties of the war is already too high to be compounded by casualties of the peace. Even now, the International Committee of the Red Cross is serving an alarming number of patients—many of them children—who have lost limbs due to land mines. And with an active repatriation program, this number could increase if the land is not cleared.

Minimally, the parties to the conflict—the Mujahidin, the Kabul forces, and the Soviet military—should provide maps of land mines laid, where such maps may exist. But there is clearly a role here for the United Nations, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the United States and others, to make every effort to clear the land of the remnants of war in order that repatriation may safely proceed.

Another possible impediment to repatriation is the Peshawar-based Afghan political parties. One senior Pakistani official remarked ruefully to the staff mission that exile Afghan party leaders have had little to do with the refugees to date, and, in fact, some party heads have never even visited a refugee camp. But, the official forecasted, those same party leaders would now try to keep refugees from leaving Pakistan, thereby pressuring the international community to meet the leaders' political demands regarding Afghanistan's future government.

It is not known how much influence Afghan party officials will have over refugees yearning to return home. Certainly, the comments of the Pakistani official have proved prescient, as certain party leaders are now rallying refugees to hold out. These party leaders have been an effective conduit for arms in the war in Afghanistan; hopefully, they will not use those arms to stop refugees from going home.

Finally, there are reports that war damage to Afghanistan's infrastructure is extensive, which adds to the repatriation challenge. Roads needed to haul food and other supplies to returnees have been destroyed. Irrigation systems which formerly supported Afghan agriculture have decayed or have been bombed, requiring speedy rehabilitation.

While the restoration of Afghanistan's infrastructure is not a *sine qua non* for repatriation—since Afghans will return and rebuild, or survive without it—the international community should appreciate the difficulty it poses for successful resettlement. But in a poor and wartorn country, the United States and others must assist in this effort as well.

## IV. BACKGROUND TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEE PROBLEM

### A. OVERVIEW

Afghanistan seized the international spotlight in December 1979 when the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of combat troops into the Afghan capital, Kabul, to support an ailing Marxist party—a move that represented the first direct Soviet aggression against a non-aligned, independent country since World War II.

Apart from the loss of over 500,000 Afghan lives since then, the most tragic consequence of this intervention has been the creation of the world's largest refugee flow. At least 3 million Afghans now reside in Pakistan, nearly 2 million have fled to Iran, and tens of thousands have been displaced within their own country.

Pakistan, as a result, has had the single largest refugee population in the world, hosting within its own borders more refugees than in east Africa, southeast Asia, and Central America combined. Between Pakistan and Iran, Afghans constitute almost half of the estimated worldwide refugee population today. Tragically, the population of Afghanistan has been reduced by a third since 1979, through death and forced migration.

The refugee situation in Pakistan stands out from refugee crises elsewhere in several ways. First, Afghans have moved with relative ease; they are not confined to camps. They live in villages and near cities, own businesses, travel on buses and trains, and traverse, as Afghans have done for centuries, the borders between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran with surprising frequency and ease.

Second, the refugees represent many ethnic groups, each of which is distinct in religious practice (though all are Muslim), language, dress, and to some extent, history. Their experiences as Afghans have been different, and they offer sometimes contrasting views of the country's predicament and how to confront it.

Third, the Government of Pakistan has assumed a major role in the refugee relief effort and has shouldered much of the financial burden. By its estimates, Pakistan contributed approximately 48 percent of the actual expenditures for refugee maintenance in fiscal year 1987.

Fourth, Pakistanis are increasingly less accommodating of the refugees. As in many host countries, attitudes toward refugees often vary according to the prospects of their return and, in the Afghan case, voluntary repatriation has never been possible until now. Accordingly, refugees have increasingly been a source of tension. Sympathy for the Afghan cause and professions of Islamic solidarity, however, continue to generate a sense of obligation in Pakistan toward the refugees.

## B. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Until 1979, Afghanistan had never been ruled by an outside power. Between 1953 and 1979, however, the Soviet Union, which shares more than a 1000-mile border with Afghanistan, concluded treaties and aid packages that yielded \$2.5 billion of military and economic aid to its southern neighbor. The United States, meanwhile, devoted its attention to its relations with Iran and Pakistan.

In 1965, the Soviet Union helped form Afghanistan's first Marxist party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), now the country's only legal political party. The party soon factionalized, splitting into two groups, Khalq ("the Masses") and Parcham ("the Banner"), because of personality conflicts and ideological and tactical differences. The former was led by Nur Mohamed Taraki, a writer, and Hafizullah Amin, a teacher, both from poor rural families; the latter was led by Babrak Karmal, a native of Kabul.

In 1973, a former prime minister named Mohamed Daoud Khan seized power and disbanded the 100-year-old monarchy, convincing most observers, including the PDPA and the U.S.S.R., that he was keen to reverse the country's political embrace of the West. In keeping with the capricious nature of Afghan politics, however, Daoud subsequently outlawed all political parties, cracked down on the left and the fundamentalist right, and sought rapprochement with Pakistan and Iran. Although Moscow remained Afghanistan's chief economic benefactor, relations between the two countries soured, prompting the Soviets to pressure Khalq and Parcham into formal reconciliation.

The PDPA was not, in the mid-1970's fit to govern the country. Apart from its divisiveness, it was an urban party with influence in Kabul but almost nowhere else and could claim only a few thousand inexperienced members. But the repressive policies of Daoud, and a climate of unrest throughout the country, enabled the PDPA to carry out a coup in April 1978, to execute Daoud, and launch the "Great Saur Revolution."

Most analysts agree that the Soviet Union, with only 350 advisors in Afghanistan in early 1978, did not orchestrate the coup but, rather, helped consolidate it once it took place. This consolidation proved problematic, however. Once in power, the PDPA quickly fissioned, while sporadic, counterrevolutionary guerrilla activity erupted in the countryside. With Taraki as President of the newly proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and Amin as the Deputy Prime Minister, the Khalq wing—the more radical and dogmatic of the two Marxist factions—quickly elbowed out its party rival. Taraki "exiled" Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham wing, to the ambassadorship of Czechoslovakia, while other Parchamis were fired, arrested, or murdered.

The new government promptly launched a series of reform measures far too radical and authoritarian for rural Afghanistan. Afghanistan in 1978 was a conservative Muslim country with a literacy rate of 5%. Ordinary villagers had much closer contact with the country's 300,000 mullahs, or local Islamic authorities, than with the central government, and were unaccustomed to heavy-handed policies from Kabul. Although changes in the country's

social structure might have been desirable to many Afghans, the government's wanton attack on traditional life—from landholding patterns to marital customs—coupled with purges in Kabul, alienated wide sectors of the Afghan population.

Initially, the United States maintained ties with the new government and continued our AID programs as well. The United States had provided more than half a billion dollars in economic aid to Afghanistan since World War II, supported a military training program, provided scholarships to Afghan students, and fielded a Peace Corps contingent. All of these programs were phased out by October 1979. In February of that year, the American ambassador, "Spike" Dubs, had been assassinated in Kabul, prompting the Carter administration to withdraw most American personnel while the Soviets busily expanded their cadre of military advisors and their influence in the day-to-day functioning of the government. All aid to Afghanistan from non-Communist countries ceased during the autumn of 1979.

The key figure through the autumn of 1979 was Hafizullah Amin, who staged his own coup in September and eliminated his former ally, Taraki. Amin was not trusted by the Soviets, however; in fact, Moscow had reportedly wanted Taraki to remove him. Even less sensitive to rural life than his predecessor, and having studied in the United States, he clearly did not enjoy the confidence of the Kremlin. His police-state tactics further damaged the credibility of the PDPA, while his reform package only further roused the opposition, plunging the country deeper into civil war.

The Soviets turned to the exiled Babrak Karmal. On December 27, 1979, after intense street fighting in Kabul, Afghan state radio announced the end of "the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin" and the leader's summary execution. Within a month, the Soviets had 85,000 troops in Afghanistan and were vigorously attempting to resuscitate the PDPA and the Afghan Army, beset by defections and desertions, and quell mounting opposition throughout the country.

### C. THE REFUGEE FLOW: NUMBERS AND PEOPLE

Although several hundred Afghan dissidents fled to Pakistan during the Daoud regime, and following the PDPA coup of April 1978 and the Amin coup in September 1979, it was the Soviet invasion that marked the real genesis of the Afghan refugee flow.

An estimated 200,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan between the Saur Revolution and the Amin coup (April 1978–September 1979). That figure doubled between the Amin coup and the Soviet invasion (September–December 1979) and by the summer of 1980 roughly 100,000 Afghans were reaching Pakistan every month.

### AFGHAN EXODUS

End of:	Afghans in Pakistan
1978.....	25,000
1979.....	400,000
1980.....	1,400,000
1981.....	2,300,000
1982.....	3,200,000

<sup>1</sup> Estimated.

Refugees in the early years represented a wide cross-section of the Afghan population. Doctors, teachers, soldiers, mullahs, the maliks (village leaders), landlords, and shopkeepers joined farmers and herders in the exodus to Pakistan. Wealthier refugees left by plane whenever possible, heading to third countries or settling in urban areas in Pakistan. The vast majority, however, were illiterate rural people, and fled on foot, taking whatever belongings and animals they could manage.

The refugee population consists of a multitude of ethnic groups reflecting Afghanistan's ethnic diversity: the numerically and politically dominant Pashtuns, or Pathans, who speak Pashto and inhabit a wide belt stretching from northeastern to southern Afghanistan; the Dari-speaking Tajiks (Dari is a variant of Persian and the country's *lingua franca*), a Turco-Mongol ethnic group located primarily in the northeast; the Hazaras, a Dari-speaking Mongol race from mountainous central Afghanistan, traditionally the nation's poorest and most underprivileged ethnic group; the northern Turkmen and Uzbeks, who speak Turkic dialects; and the Baluch, from the southwest. Other groups include the *Qizilbash*, the Kirghiz, and the Nursitanis. Regardless of ethnic affiliation, the refugees are Muslim; and most follow the Sunni, or orthodox, branch of Islam. The Hazaras are the largest Shia (Shiite) minority and, therefore, have important links with Iran, a fact that bears significantly on Iran's largely unnoticed involvement in the Afghan war.

#### D. PAKISTAN'S REFUGEE POLICY

As noted earlier, Pakistan has consistently maintained an open-door policy toward Afghan refugees and has complied with the spirit of the 1951 U.N. Convention and the Protocol of 1967 without having actually signed either document. The entry, stay, and movement of all foreigners in the country is regulated by the Foreigners Act of 1956, which has not been amended to include a temporary asylum category. Technically, therefore, refugees are illegal immigrants. In its public pronouncements Pakistan claims that it is accommodating the Afghans according to its Islamic and humanitarian duties, and because of Pakistan's cultural, ethnic, and religious links with Afghanistan.

At the same time, Pakistan has placed numerous restrictions on the refugees, though some are not enforced, while others have not realistically been enforceable. Generally, Pakistan has stressed, both in policy and rhetoric, the impermanence of the refugee situation. For instance, refugees are not permitted to purchase immovable property and are expected to dwell where the government assigns them.

#### 1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) sets refugee policy in Pakistan. Under its jurisdiction are the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), which oversees the logistics of the relief operation and functions as an attached department under SAFRON, and the Federal Committee for Relief of Afghan Refugees, which coordinates with voluntary agencies and the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assessing the requirements of refugees and in distributing relief goods.

A Commissioner for Afghan Refugees oversees implementation of refugee policy in each province and reports to the provincial Home Department and governor. The provinces involved are Sind, Baluchistan, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). About three quarters of the refugee population lives in NWFP, particularly around the capital, Peshawar.

## 2. THE REFUGEE VILLAGE

The "refugee village" is the basic unit of settlement for Afghans. Some refer to these units as Refugee Tented Villages, but so few of the inhabitants now actually live in tents that the name is hardly appropriate. One reason the term was used by Pakistan at the outset was to stress the transience of the refugee population.

The refugee village is designed to be self-sufficient. There are primary and secondary schools, usually segregated by sex according to local and Afghan custom, though there are far fewer schools for girls than boys. Local colleges and universities sometimes reserve a few seats for Afghans. Each village contains a basic health unit, provided on a scale of one per 15,000 refugees, which is staffed by nurses, midwives, dispensers, sanitary inspectors, and other medical personnel.

What immediately distinguishes a refugee camp in Pakistan from refugee settlements in other countries is its resemblance to sprawling village rather than a refugee camp. Most inhabitants live in mud-brick huts within mud-walled compounds that they themselves have built and that require reconstruction every few years. Normally there are no enclosures around the settlement, no physical barriers to keep people from coming and going. Inside, there is usually a central thoroughfare lined with shops including bicycle repair, tailoring, meat and vegetable stalls, hair-cutting, and other small businesses. There is, finally, the mosque, usually the tidiest and best-maintained structure in the settlement.

## E. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND ITS IMPACT

The international community began aiding Afghan refugees in the fall of 1979. During the preceding months, refugees sustained themselves through Pakistani and other local support, and through their own ingenuity. Since the border that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan also splits certain ethnic groups (the Pashtun and the Baluch in particular), creating "cross-border tribes," many refugees were welcomed by clan members in Pakistan, who extended hospitality in exchange for favors, labor, or support in local conflicts. Hospitality to those in need is also an important tenet of Islam.

### 1. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Since 1980, the international community has borne an increasing share of the Afghan refugee burden that costs roughly \$1 million a day. UNHCR established its offices in October 1979 and through 1986 has spent nearly \$600 million on refugee programs. The World Food Program (WFP) spends roughly \$125 million annually

on its operation, which in 1986 involved the delivery of more than 500,000 tons of food. In 1987 WFP appealed to its international donors for 400,000 metric tons of wheat, 21,000 metric tons of edible oil, and 14,000 metric tons of sugar. Contributions to Pakistan under bilateral programs, meanwhile, include trucks and spare parts from West Germany and Japan, ambulances from China and South Korea, kerosene from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and medical equipment from Norway.

Working closely with Pakistan and voluntary agencies, UNHCR coordinates international aid and supervises the implementation of relief efforts. At the outset, UNHCR focused on the immediate needs of recent arrivals, particularly with respect to health, shelter, and water. By late 1984, most refugee concentrations were adequately served in these areas. Accordingly, in 1985 UNHCR shifted its focus from basic relief and maintenance to self-reliance, concentrating in particular on income-generating schemes and vocational training, education, and veterinary services for livestock. These sectors have accounted for 30 percent of UNHCR's budget for Pakistan, which for 1987 was targeted at \$52 million—a significant decrease from 1986, but still a larger amount than any UNHCR budget elsewhere in the world.

One of the most widely publicized and ambitious projects that UNHCR assisted has been a joint income-generating scheme with Pakistan and the World Bank. Started in early 1984, the scheme consists of dozens of sub-projects aimed at improving the Pakistani infrastructure and repairing environmental damage in heavily refugee-impacted areas. Operating on a budget of \$20 million, the project seeks to employ equal numbers of refugees and locals in efforts ranging from reforestation and road-building to flood control and fish breeding.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) fills a vital role in the relief effort. ICRC primarily assists war-wounded Afghans. It operates surgical hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta, mobile medical teams in NWFP and Baluchistan, and a paraplegic center and prosthesis workshop in Peshawar. ICRC also trains teams of Afghan sanitarians and orderlies to assist war victims inside Afghanistan.

## 2. U.S. ASSISTANCE

The United States and Pakistan are the largest contributors to the welfare of Afghans in Pakistan. The United States channels its aid primarily through two channels: U.N. agencies and the voluntary agencies. To UNHCR, the United States pledged \$17 million in 1978 for Afghan relief, or almost a third of UNHCR's program budget for the year, earmarking portions of its contribution for income-generating projects, the construction of water supply systems and access roads in Baluchistan and the Punjab, and the further refinement of the health care delivery system. Since 1980, U.S. assistance to UNHCR has averaged \$20 million annually. The United States also contributes to the reforestation portion of the UNHCR World Bank project.

Under PL-480 Title II, WFP has received close to \$350 million in food commodities from the United States since 1979. PL-480, or the

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, authorized the Food for Peace Program, the major program through which the United States provides food assistance to other nations. Title II authorizes the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to nations for the purpose of alleviating famine or providing disaster relief, combatting malnutrition, and encouraging economic and community development.

Meanwhile, the United States continues to support a variety of smaller agencies and projects. In the early 1980's, the American focus was primarily on the health sector, but, in keeping with Pakistan policy, has since broadened to address the larger issue of self-reliance. The agencies that have received U.S. funding since the early 1980's are Church World Service (preventative/curative health care programs), Catholic Relief Service (health education and sanitation), the International Rescue Committee (health care and education), the Salvation Army (health care and vocational rehabilitation/self-help), and Americares (the Afghan Female Surgical Hospital). In 1985, the United States started funding a Save the Children Federation income-generating project that targets widows and families with no alternative sources of income.

One of the recurring headaches for the donor community has been the "numbers game"—determining the size of the refugee population in general, and the size of refugee households in particular. A 1986 joint WFP/UNHCR mission report lamented that "the mobility and ingenuity of the Afghan refugees has continually frustrated the best efforts of Pakistan to determine an accurate population figure. Similarly, the absence of a reliable population figure has made it difficult in the past to determine the quantities of emergency food aid required."

#### U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM

(In millions of dollars)

FY Disbursing Organization	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1980-87 Total
UNHCR (\$)	5.0	30.0	24.2	23.0	20.1	19.7	15.17	17.427	154.6
UNHCR (R)	3.8	2.6	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.3	3.80	4.197	26.1
World Bank (R)					.8	1.0		3.000	4.8
WFP* (\$)	31.9	39.3	70.6	37.3	42.2	40.0	25.28	37.400	324.0
WFP Members (\$)								.103	.1
WFP Members (R)						2			.2
ICRC (\$)	.3	1.0	.7	1.0	1.4	.7	1.00	1.000	7.1
ICRC (R)			.3	.5	.8	.8	.78	1.200	4.3
Loriss (R)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	.8	.70	.700	7.2
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>73.9</b>	<b>99.8</b>	<b>66.3</b>	<b>69.3</b>	<b>65.5</b>	<b>46.73</b>	<b>65.027</b>	<b>528.6</b>

#### American Volags:

AMERICARES (\$)							.12		.1
CIS (\$)		.2		.3			.39	.078	1.3
CIS (R)		.5				.1			.7
CWS (\$)		.5	.4	.4	.5	.6	.22	.173	2.8
CWS (R)		.3				2	.41	.416	1.3
EA (\$)									.2
IRC (\$)			.7		.3	.3	.53	.442	2.2
IRC (R)		.3				2	.31	.485	1.3
HF (\$)									.2
SA (\$)		2		.5	.4	.5	.75	.670	3.0
SCF (\$)							.95	.129	.1



## U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM—Continued

(In millions of dollars)

FY Obligations/Organization	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1980-87 Total
WFPD (\$)								—	.0
Volog Subtotal	0	2.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	2.3	2.77	2.867	13.5
Government of Pakistan		8.0			3				8.3
Total by FY	42.0	84.0	100.9	67.5	70.8	67.8	49.50	68.596	551.1

Notes:

FY 1987 figures rounded to nearest \$1,000

FY 1986 figures rounded to nearest \$10,000

Previous years' figures rounded to nearest \$100,000

\$ US Dollars

\* Non-incorporated excess foreign currency (Pakistan rupee) contribution. FY 1987 exchange rate equaled 17.21 rupees per dollar.

\* PL-480 Title II excess food commodities (wheat, vegetable oil dried milk) provided through World Food Program. Includes value of commodities and shipping.

CPS = Catholic Relief Services; CWS = Church World Service; IRC = International Rescue Committee; SA = Salvation Army; SCF = Save The Children Federation; U.S. EIL = Experiment in International Living; WFF = Mercy Fund; WVRG = World Vision.

## DONOR PLEDGES: WFP PROGRAM FOR AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN

(All figures in metric tons)

When Donors	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Total
Australia	—	10,000	10,000	—	25,000	20,000	20,000	20,000	—	105,000
	*10,000	*22,875	—	*25,000	—	—	*15,000	—	—	*62,875
Belgium	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	*2,000	*2,994	*1,540	—	—	—	—	*6,534
Canada	—	22,533	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22,533
	—	*16,425	*28,650	*57,915	*33,050	*56,026	*50,000	*38,000	—	*261,176
EEC	—	5,000	24,596	—	—	—	—	—	—	23,596
	*12,000	*15,000	*30,000	*65,446	*40,200	*34,300	*44,957	*65,000	—	*306,903
France	5,000	7,000	9,500	5,000	10,000	10,000	12,000	14,000	—	72,500
	—	*9,000	*16,500	*15,000	*5,000	*5,000	*5,000	*6,000	—	*61,500
FRG	—	24,044	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	24,044
	*7,500	*18,101	*15,650	*27,059	*25,500	*21,635	33,053	*31,101	—	*183,609
Italy	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,000	3,000	—	3,000
	—	—	—	—	—	*3,000	—	—	—	*3,000
Japan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	*4,330	*35,000	*40,850	*52,819	*44,060	*74,000	*110,000	*110,000	—	*474,959
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	*1,084	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*1,084
Netherlands	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	*15,000	—	—	*15,000
Norway	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
OECD	—	16,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16,000
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PRC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	5,000	—	—	*5,000
Switzerland	—	950	—	—	—	—	10,000	—	—	10,950
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Turkey	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	*3,828	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	*3,828
UK	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	—	—	*14,550	*7,877	*8,500	—	—	—	—	*31,027
USA	38,035	160,450	135,317	180,000	149,542	150,000	160,000	165,000	165,000	1,200,355
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	141,825	360,328	323,013	439,120	342,502	353,961	479,010	452,101	165,000	3,063,922

\* Includes bilateral contribution through WFP. All other figures are for contributions to WFP Program through #1300L Rev 02/24/88.

Refugees have used a variety of techniques to inflate their family size to acquire more than their monthly allotment of food. They might sell or loan their passbooks, in which the receipt of rations is stamped; deny food monitors access to their households on the grounds that non-family members are forbidden to set eyes on the resident women; or bribe Pakistani officials. They also double-register. Local Pakistanis sometimes pose as refugees. Particularly in Baluchistan, refugees let the "ration malik" function as the provider, which goes against the wishes of the UNHCR that rations go through family heads only. As a result, some refugees live well while others struggle, and new arrivals have sometimes gone unregistered for months.

Pakistan estimates that there are also 300,000-400,000 unregistered Afghan refugees. Registration delays have been caused by several factors: the isolation of some border crossings, the difficulty of distinguishing genuine new arrivals from imposters seeking to re-register, and the Pakistan policy of closing registration in certain areas to avoid upsetting the population balance between locals and refugees. Some new arrivals have waited weeks or months for regular rations, living on handouts and loans from relatives or from the registered population. Even for the registered population, food distribution has been limited and erratic.

## F. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION

In spite of many problems in the relief pipeline, the vagaries of the distribution system, occasional disharmony between relief agencies, the shortage of managers and trained personnel, the relief effort has been remarkably successful. The condition of most refugees has shown considerable improvement since 1980; mud-walled houses have replaced clusters of tents in barren landscapes, and basic relief requirements have been met. Malnutrition exists but only in pockets, and medical care, described in a 1981 congressional report as "so minimal as to be virtually nonexistent," has today improved remarkably.

### 1. HEALTH AND NUTRITION

As always, children remain the most vulnerable category in terms of health and nutrition. A Center for Disease Control (CDC) survey in 1986 computed an infant-mortality rate of 80 per 1000 live births in its random sample; the rate was higher in Baluchistan than in NWFP. The major causes of mortality were gastrointestinal disorders, tetanus, and measles. The CDC findings suggest that roughly a third of child deaths are diarrhea-related, a sobering statistic given that probably 20 percent of the entire registered population is under 5 years of age—and what conditions these children will face during a repatriation to war-ravaged Afghanistan.

The overall nutritional status of the refugees is adequate and may, in fact, be better than that of the local Pakistani population in some areas. Some health personnel report that a major detriment to nutritional well-being among infants is the tendency of mothers to prolong breast feeding without supplements until well beyond the child's first birthday, and not to provide calorie-dense foods during the weaning period.

Anemia remains the main micro-nutrient deficiency, affecting women of child-bearing age in particular. High rates of worm infestation, repeated pregnancies, and a wheat-based diet all contribute to this problem. That refugees continue to suffer from basic ailments and easily treated diseases underlines the urgency of supplementary feeding programs, especially in the context of a future repatriation program.

## 2. EMPLOYMENT

Apart from receiving food rations, on which they depend for meeting basic nutritional needs, many Afghans are able to supplement their diet with purchased commodities. To the dismay of many Pakistanis, refugees have moved securely into the local economy in many areas and, therefore, have outside incomes. They run small businesses in the refugee villages; work in nearby rural areas (a move that Pakistan has, at times, encouraged to ease congestion in certain market sectors); commute to nearby towns on buses owned and operated by other Afghans; leave for several weeks to mine coal or build roads; work with voluntary agencies; move to Karachi and the Gulf states; come and go to Iran; bring carpets out of Afghanistan and open shops in urban areas; and cook and housewatch for expatriates. The standard wage for unskilled labor in 1987 was 25-30 rupees a day, or about \$1.50.

Women do not have the same mobility as men. Traditional Afghan rural culture discourages women from having a substantial role outside of the home, even from being educated. A number of voluntary agency-sponsored income-generating projects target women, however, providing them with handicraft material and locating markets for their products, such as carpets.

To carve out an economic niche for themselves, many Afghans have taken up residence in urban areas. Cities and towns also draw refugees who can afford to live outside the refugee village and, therefore, the distribution network. The populations of Peshawar and Quetta are roughly a quarter Afghan now; there are also sizeable refugee neighborhoods in Islamabad and Karachi. Refugees rent houses, live in hotels, or pitch tents in vacant lots. Families will occasionally split up, with the father moving to town to find work while the mother remains in the refugee village with the children, or some of them.

## 3. OVERSEAS RESETTLEMENT

Third-country resettlement has not played an important role in the Afghan situation. The majority of refugees clearly prefer to return to their own country, an opportunity they will soon have. Nevertheless, by the end of 1987 the United States had resettled about 20,000 Afghans, many of them well-educated urbanites. The largest resettlement areas are in Washington, D.C., New York City, the San Francisco Bay area, and Los Angeles. While there are few detailed studies on the subject, it is widely believed that many Afghans are not adjusting easily to American society. Like most refugees, Afghans were proud and independent in their native land, where they place a premium on providing hospitality and entertaining guests. Many now remain socially isolated in the United

States, uneasy with cultural disparities, the loss of status, the difficulty of finding jobs commensurate with positions held previously, and the decision to place family needs ahead of the resistance struggle. The majority of Afghans in the United States also express a desire to return to Afghanistan someday, a desire that may detract from their ability or desire to set long-term goals in the United States.

Other countries that have resettled Afghans include Turkey, Australia, Canada, and West Germany.

## V. IMPACT ON PAKISTAN OF REFUGEE PROBLEM

The signing of the Geneva accords, and the prospect for the first time in over 9 years that large numbers of Afghan refugees might be able to return to their homes, could not have come at a more critical time for Pakistan.

Over the past few years, the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has exacted an ever-increasing toll monetarily, environmentally, and politically. The continuing Afghan refugee presence, with no end in sight, has been viewed by many Pakistanis with growing alarm. Indeed, most observers in the field believe that had a settlement not been reached this year—had the Afghan refugees been forced to remain in Pakistan for several more years—tensions between the refugees and local Pakistanis could have reached an explosive point and become a serious political issue for the Pakistan government.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent influx of refugees clearly raised a number of critical issues for Pakistan. Environmentally, Afghan refugees have denuded whole valleys of trees while their 2-3 million livestock have trampled or gobbled thousands of acres of vegetation, causing serious erosion problems. Economically, the refugee's presence has cost Pakistan considerably, despite generous international support. A nation with a per capita income of only \$400, Pakistan spent \$174 million for refugee assistance in fiscal 1987. Refugees, meanwhile, have generated resentment because of their penetration into local economies and infringement on scarce resources.

In terms of security, the presence of the Afghan refugee resistance has drawn Soviet and Afghan aircraft to bomb and strafe targets inside Pakistan, killing and wounding both refugees and local citizens. Foreign agents, blending in with the refugee population, have planted with growing regularity bombs at hospitals and schools, or in bazaars and vegetable carts. Over the past several months, a week has not gone by without further loss of life. Finally, due to the amount of arms flowing in and out of Pakistan, a climate akin to the old American West prevails along the Afghan border. The intermittent rioting in Karachi is partly the result of Afghan (Pashtun, specifically) involvement in arms and drug trafficking. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, the refugees are the root cause of many of these troubling developments.

Although the Afghan refugee crisis triggered a massive aid program for Pakistan, and perhaps elevated that country's status in the Muslim world, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had clearly placed Pakistan in a vulnerable position. As a result, Pakistan has led the opposition to the Soviet presence from the outset. A central component to that opposition has been its unofficial acquiescence as a conduit for aid to the resistance.

## VI. FORCES LEADING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The settlement that has been reached in Geneva is clearly the result of forces at work in the field for some years—the growing military pressure of the Afghan resistance (the Mujahidin), the inability of Soviet troops to eliminate or really control those forces, and the weakness and vulnerability of the regimes in Kabul. From the interplay of those forces over the past several years, but particularly last year, decisions were reached in Islamabad, Washington, and especially in Moscow, that have led to the prospect of a settlement and the repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees.

An unobstructed assistance pipeline through Pakistan has been crucial to efforts to aid the Mujahidin, and the CIA has directed the largest American covert operation since the Vietnam war across the border into Afghanistan. While some Middle Eastern and Asian countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China—also assisted the rebels, the U.S. aid package alone, consisting of weapons, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, and money for food, reached an estimated \$630 million in fiscal year 1987. This package comes on top of a \$3.2 billion, 6-year economic and 5-year military assistance program to Pakistan that began in 1981 and that Congress renewed, with stipulations, in the fall of 1987.

Publicly, the United States has been an unwavering supporter of the Mujahidin since 1979, as has the United Nations, whose resolutions condemning foreign intervention in Afghanistan have passed by large margins every year.

### A. U.S. ASSISTANCE

Since late 1984, when Congress approved a resolution (Senate Congressional Resolution 74) calling on the United States to "support effectively the people of Afghanistan in their fight for freedom," the United States has escalated the aid program across the border. In April 1985, President Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive calling on the United States to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available." The Senate followed its earlier pronouncements with a resolution in January 1987 to "renew its commitment . . . to support the people of Afghanistan through the provision of appropriate material support." The upshot was an increase in both the quantity and sophistication of weapons supplied to the guerrillas, and the appearance inside Afghanistan of U.S.-directed humanitarian assistance programs.

In terms of weapons, the most significant development was the provision of "Stinger" missiles to the Mujahidin. The Stinger is a portable, 34 pound, heat-seeking, shoulder fired antiaircraft missile which the guerrillas have used with increasing effectiveness since shipments and training began in late 1986. The Stinger was the latest addition to an arsenal that already included rocket-propelled

grenades, Sam-7 heat-seeking missiles, tanks, semiautomatic rifles, and whatever else the insurgents have captured on their own.

While better training and weaponry increased the fighting power of the Mujahidin, it is widely believed among officials involved with the pipeline that anywhere from 20-70 percent of U.S. military aid for the insurgents never reached its real destination; rather, for reasons ranging from expediency to personal profit, it has been appropriated, traded, sold, or hidden by groups with access to the shipments—to the Pakistan armed forces, Afghan political parties based in Peshawar, rebel commanders or individual guerrillas.

Meanwhile, in 1985, the United States developed an AID administered cross-border humanitarian assistance program for Afghanistan. Its short-term component has consisted of grants in foreign assistance that are typically made to American and European voluntary agencies in Pakistan, which then transfer the funds to non-American groups operating inside Afghanistan. In 1987, some \$30 million in U.S. grants supported medical clinics inside Afghanistan, medical training for Afghans, food provisions for deficit areas inside Afghanistan, and a variety of activities aimed at strengthening education, transportation, and commodity support in rebel-held areas.

A longer term component is a larger, more ambitious, and more controversial part of the cross-border program. Its emphasis has been sectoral. In the health sector, the goal has been to develop extensive curative health services for war-related injuries and preventive services for basic public health, including maternal and child care. In education, the aim has been to support and improve existing lower schools in resistance-controlled areas, which would include training teachers, providing school supplies, and funding school construction. In agriculture, the focus has been on the attainment of self-sufficiency through the provision of agricultural extension and technical assistance. And in commodity support, the task has been to make available food, agricultural inputs, and a range of humanitarian goods to encourage the continuation of food production in rural Afghanistan.

The objectives of the cross border program were, and continue to be, humanitarian. The underlying rationale is that a continued refugee flow debilitates the resistance and overtaxes Pakistan economically and politically. The immediate objective was to improve the ability of Afghans to sustain themselves inside Afghanistan. Strategists hope that, as a result, emigration from rural areas to Soviet-Afghan government controlled urban areas would decline, and that Afghans in Pakistan will voluntarily return to resistance-controlled areas.

AID administers the cross-border program through its Representative for Afghan Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, an office that was established in September 1985 and is staffed by career AID personnel. Probably the most important function of this office has been to work closely with the seven-party Mujahidin alliance, the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahidin, in identifying target areas. These seven resistance groups, which have formed health, education, and logistics committees to oversee the imple-

mentation of the program, channel whatever goods and equipment AID provides to field commanders inside Afghanistan.

The Afghan Affairs office also oversees an Economic Support Fund program, a PL-480 Title II emergency relief food grant (wheat and soybean oil) for war-affected Afghans, and the implementation of the Department of Defense-funded "McCollum Amendment" program. The Economic Support Fund makes available funds for the provision of food, medicine, or other humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people. The McCollum Amendment (Section 308 of PL-235) calls for the Secretary of Defense to "provide nonlethal assistance . . . to persons displaced or who are refugees because of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union." Nonlethal assistance comes primarily from Department of Defense surpluses and from private American groups; the Denton Amendment (1984) authorizes the Pentagon to transport humanitarian aid provided by private groups, on military aircraft at no cost, when space is available. McCollum funds have also financed the transportation of Afghans to the United States for medical treatment; as of June 1987, 325 patients had been moved under the program. Congress earmarked \$15 million in ESF funds for war-affected Afghans in fiscal year 1986, and added \$30 million to the program in fiscal year 1987. The PL-480 program cost \$15 million in 1986, while 1986 funds for the McCollum program amounted to \$10 million.

## B. UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION

Although the crucial point in breaking the deadlock and prolonged conflict in Afghanistan was the decision by the Soviet Union, as announced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to withdraw, unilaterally if necessary, all Soviet forces from the country—that decision might not have occurred without the negotiations launched in 1982 by the United Nations Secretary General. No international agreement could have been reached without the neutrality, the persistence and patience of the United Nations negotiator, Mr. Diego Cordovez.

The Geneva talks had taken place intermittently since June 1982. Representatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan did not meet face-to-face, however; negotiations were conducted by Mr. Cordovez between Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran. (Iran, although home to an estimated two million Afghan refugees, had refused to participate directly because the Afghan Mujahidin were not officially represented in the negotiations.)

As signed in Geneva, and as described earlier, the accords consist of four instruments: non-interference, international guarantees concerning non-interference, the repatriation of refugees, and "interrelationships," or the relationship between a Soviet withdrawal and an end to Pakistan's support for the resistance; [See Appendix for text].

Those accords are truly the force that will hopefully lead to peace and stability in Afghanistan—and to the opportunity for millions of its refugees to return to their homes and lands.



## APPENDIX

### FINAL TEXT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS

April 13, 5 p.m., 1988

#### **BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION**

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,

Have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

#### ARTICLE II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

(1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other

High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;

(2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

(3) To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;

(4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;

(5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;

(6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;

(7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;

(8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

(9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;

(12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in

the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups; (13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

#### ARTICLE III

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

#### ARTICLE IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

#### ARTICLE V

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In the case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

For the Government of the  
Republic of Afghanistan:

For the Government of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

#### DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention;

Urge all States to act likewise.

The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

For the Government of the  
United States of America:

**BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN  
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE VOLUNTARY  
RETURN OF REFUGEES**

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

**ARTICLE II**

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

(a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;

(b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;

(c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the State;

(d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;

(e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

**ARTICLE III**

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

## ARTICLE IV

For the purpose of organising, coordinating and supervising the operations which should affect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

## ARTICLE V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

## ARTICLE VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

## ARTICLE VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

## ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

For the Government of the  
Republic of Afghanistan:

For the Government of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF  
THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settle-

ment of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The duty to States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

The principle of sovereign equality of States;

The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention;

A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; the Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the timeframe envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval

suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

5. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was present.

Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

For the Government of the  
Republic of Afghanistan:

For the Government of the  
Islamic Republic of Pakistan:

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors affixed their signatures hereunder:

For the Government of the  
Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

For the Government of the  
United States of America:

## ANNEX

### MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

#### 1. BASIC REQUIREMENTS

(a) The Parties will provide full support and co-operation to the Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him;

(b) The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance, including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to grant to the Representative and his staff all



the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

(c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries.

(d) In performing their functions, the Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the Parties concerned.

## II. MANDATE

The mandate for the implementation-assistance as derived from arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

## III. MODUS OPERANDI AND PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military Officer as Deputy to the Representative, who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military Officers, drawn from existing UN operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Parties through the Liaison Officer each Party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two Inspection Teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 additional military Officers (some 10 additional Inspection Teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

The nationalities of all the Officers will be determined in consultation with the Parties.

Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-General, who will periodically visit the area for consultations with the Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to the area members of his own office and other civilian personnel from the UN Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alternate between the two headquarters units and will remain at all times in close communication with him.

## IV. PROCEDURE

(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties:

(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the settlement lodged by any of the Parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.

(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other Party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories.

(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the two Governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of the Report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.) In accordance with paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his good office(s) to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by the Representative of the Secretary-General.)

(b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General:

In addition to inspections requested by the Parties, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the Parties will be followed.

*Level of participation in meetings.*—As indicated above, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such meetings.

#### V. DURATION

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of

all timeframes envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.

#### VI. FINANCING

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the Parties will be borne by the respective Governments. The salaries and travel expenses of the international personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.

#### U.S. STATEMENT

The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, in ending the bloodshed in that unfortunate country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In agreeing to act as guarantor, the United States states the following:

(1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determination as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that the United States retains the right, consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States similarly will exercise restraint.

(3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime in Kabul as the lawful government of Afghanistan.

